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PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWS IN
JURISPRUDENTIAL THEORIES
RoBERT S. REDMOUNT Jurisprudentialinquiry proceeds upon certain assumptions about the nature
of nan. Psychological theorizing is an enterprise directed toward the
critical examination of assumptions such as these, and the formulation of
hypotheses about human conduct. Yet despite the patent interdependence
of these disciplines, there has been little effort made to correlate them. In
this Article, Mr. Redmount, who is both a psychologist and a lawyer,
examines the psychological theories of certain jurisprudents,and the theories
of law of certain psychologists. Building upon this discussion, the author
offers a set of systematized hypotheses which center about the psychological
dependency of the individual on his environment. Mr. Redmount's prior
writings have dealt with the application of psychological principles to the
nore practical courtroom aspects of law.

It seems strange, at least to a psychologically trained person, that
theories relating to law give so little consideration to psychological
man. It is as though man were substantially an incident of law or that
his adaptation to conceptions of law is to be taken as a matter of course.
Perhaps there is some implicit notion concerning the nature of man that
is built into the theorizing given to law, or perhaps there is the feeling
that man cannot be understood except as he is part of some larger
social process.
It is, in fact, more reassuring to take man for granted because
only in that way can one most effectively exercise the gifts of thought.
And legal theorists are thinking persons wedded to thought as the
mainspring of human action, regarding it as the legitimate source of
experience, motivation and control. There is much to be said for this
point of view, and also much that is left out.
Theories of man in existing theories of law are hard to come by.
They occur infrequently-at least, they are not articulated very muchand, where they exist, they are not developed.
* The author is greatly in the debt of Professor William Morison of the University
of Sydney and last year Senior Fellow and Lecturer at the Yale University School
of Law. It was he who suggested that the author develop this Article beyond mere
personal formulation into an analysis and critique of notable psychological views in
jurisprudence. It was his gracious but incisive criticisms, and those of Dr. Jaques
Kaswan, late of Yale University and presently of the Psychology Department of
the University of California at Los Angeles, that delivered the probity of the
writing. An appointment as Research Associate under a National Institute of
Health grant to the Yale Law School made possible the preparation and presentation of this Article.
t Member, Connecticut Bar. A.B., 1943, M.S., 1947, Pennsylvania State University; Ph.D., 1949, New York University; LL.B., 1957, Yale University.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWS IN JURISPRUDENCE
KARL OLIVECRONA

The fullest psychological treatment given in law is to be found in
the jurisprudence of the "Scandinavian realists," and most particularly
in the work of Professor Olivecrona.' Professor Olivecrona's psychological man is a creature driven by egoistic desire. He seeks primarily
"self preservation, security, power and the like." 2 In fact, Olivecrona
implies that man's essential motives-"drives" is perhaps a more accurate term-are even baser. They appear to be hostile and violent in
character.3 It is, at bottom, this view of man, shared by Hobbes and
later by Freud, that gives rise to the urgency and 'the utility of law.
The principal rules of law curb baser desires through a prolonged
educative process. The rules of law project into view ideas about
behavior, "ideas of imaginary actions by people in imaginarysituations
. . . the actions [serving] as models for actual conduct when the
corresponding situations arise in real life." 4 The ideas-sometimes
they are said to be feelings-are the "binding force of the law"-the
essential theme in Olivecrona's views.
The hypnotic effect of rules of law is traced back to an account of
magical influence in the operation of Roman law, by reference to
H~igerstrbm's work on the Roman concept of Obligation.5 Our "imaginary" notions of rules of law are recognized as having influenced
behavior at one time because of the practice of investing statements of
duty and obligation with automatic properties for generating effects.
The words invoked or contained magic, and expectations of fulfillment
or penalty were thought to be invariably realized. More nearly toward
the present, notions of rules of law are recognized to have meaning and
effect because of the consequences that usually and logically follow from
the understandings and the actions implied in declarative statements.6
Causation has traversed the range from ideas of magic to those more
nearly related to logic. But, whatever the explanation, notions of rules
of law are recognized to have regular meanings and effects in experience. There is, in fact, a long history of adaptive response to legal
rules that has cumulatively resulted in a "habitual obedience to rules." 7
However, Professor Olivecrona makes out that it is not entirely
habit and custom that are the sources of obedience to law. The imperative form of rules stresses the urgency that behavior take a peculiar form
1. OuvcRONA, LAW AS FAcT (1939).
2. Id. at 169.
3. Id. at 125.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

29-30.
114.
115.
52-53.
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and direction.' And, to insure an attitude of obedience toward the law,
or to prevent disobedience, the threat of force, administered by the state,
acts as a secondary reinforcement.
Force operates through a dual process of suggestion and effect,
operating sometimes in concert and sometimes independently of one
another. Professor Olivecrona emphasizes that it is not just the
awareness of specific applications of organized (state-controlled) force
but the general subconscious awareness of the existence of organized
force that impresses itself on the consciousness of man and exerts pressure toward lawful behavior.'
The influence of force can take place because of the suggestive and
educative effects induced by fear of punishment. However, this is
regarded as secondary or, at least, subconscious in the motivational
processes of the typical human being. A pathological or unlawful
desire opposed by a threat of punishment and an accompanying sense
of fear, existing as a constant tension state for the individual, is regarded as "intolerable" and "disruptive" for most persons. Instead,
we tend to exclude "thought of unlawful acts" from consciousness
because we seek "peace of mind instinctively." ' The awareness ot
force acts primarily or most immediately to reinforce "habits of obedience to rules" which serve to personal advantage in social relations."
Rules of law concern not only the "don'ts" of human relations but also
the "do's." Force according to the rules educates not only about
wrong but also about right.' 2
If we make out Professor Olivecrona's psychological thesis correctly, his view of the human being is not unlike that of Freud. It is
more diffuse in some respects and demonstrates a greater sociological
bent in others. Clearly, law is a centripetal force for mankind for
Olivecrona, while in Freud it is scarcely given formal notice.
Olivecrona, like Freud, postulates basal instincts, though he does
not label them as such. Freud refers to instincts of sex and aggression '" and Olivecrona makes specific mention of "desires for selfpreservation, for security, for power and the like," '4 more in the
schismatic psychoanalytic tradition of Alfred Adler and the later "neo8. Id. at 31.
9. Id. at 140-43.
10. Id. at 147-48.
11. See id. at 144.
12. See id. at 169.
13. See the elementary discussion of Freud's instinct hypotheses and their
present status in BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TExTBOoK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 16-33
(Anchor ed. 1957). See also HENDRICK, FACTS AND THEORIES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
91-140 (3d ed. 1958).
14. OLIVECRONA, op. cit. supra note 1, at 169.
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Freudians," Karen Horney and Erich Fromm. It was Adler who
premised man's behavior on his "longing for superiority," 11 and
Horney who stressed man's effort to achieve a "feeling of greater
security," "I particularly neurotic man's, through "the quest for power,
prestige and possession." '7 And it was Fromm who probed man's
impotence and isolation in relation to the world, resulting in "mechanisms of escape" from his "freedom," sometimes by slavish adherence
to and dependence upon custom or overpowering authority.'"
Olivecrona proposes a view of consciousness as a dynamic process.
A dualism or continuum is established between conscious thought and
activity, and something-less-than-conscious. Something like Freud's
fundamental schema of behavior, with the important delineation of an
aimed and vaunted "unconscious," seems implicitly assumed. 9 Behavior tendency, in both Olivecrona and Freud, exists at minimally
two levels or stages of experience. The tendencies that are more remote
from external reality appear to be more primitive and unsocial, though
subject to social influences. Those closer to reality, and to a state of
conscious awareness-in Freud they are merely a different form of
the same tendency-are commonly more adaptive and altruistic. It is
they, most of all, or most immediately, that are influenced by the pressures arising from social experience.
The* social experience that Olivecrona postulates as most significant to human behavior is of a different quality from Freud's.
Olivecrona notes that "parents are anxious to instil obedience to the
law into their children" 20 and that "first indelible impressions in early
youth concerning the relations to other people are directly or indirectly
derived from the law." 21 But this is only remotely like Freud's
emphasis on "primary group" (immediate family) experience as the
most critical influence in social development. Freud stresses the importance of pleasures and pains in association with parents as the
fundament in developing man's sociability. It is the character and
intensity of personal experiences with parents, at some point leading to
the solicitation of their acceptance and renunciation of asocial and anti15. ADLEa, THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY
transl. 1929).
16. HoaqEY, THE NEUROTiC PERSONALrITY o OUR TIME 163 (1937).

(Radin

17. Id. at 162.
18. See FRomm, ESCAPE FROm FRE~om 140 (1941).
19. A compact but perceptive and analytical presentation of the basic theories
Freud is to be found either in HENDRICK, Op. Cit. supra note 13, or in BREm,
op. cit. supra note 13. A capable comparative analysis and critique of more orthodox
Freudianism and of the major deviationist psychoanalytic theories is presented
by MuN oE, SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOANALYTC THOUGHT (1955).
20. OLmVEcR NA, op. cit. supra note 1, at 147.
21. Id. at 154. (Emphasis added.)

of
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social behavior, that produces proper inhibition and conformity in
relation to authority. The process is one of evolution in the stage and
condition of consciousness known as the "super-ego" 2 or, in its
slightly advanced form, conscience. The emphasis, if not the intent,
in Olivecrona's formulations appears different. Law appears to operate
directly upon the human personality and only indirectly or incidently
through the agency of the parent serving as a model for authority.
Law, in Professor Olivecrona's formulation, is experienced as an
"idea," as thought and imagination, though sometimes reference is
made to a "feeling" of "binding force." The content of thought is not
substantially derived from personal experience but from a non-Freudian
kind of introjection of social sentiments and attitudes. The capillary
attraction resulting in this transference of law to the human being
has an uncertainly defined source. Juxtaposed in relation to existing
psychological theory, it bears some resemblance to Carl Jung's concept
of the "collective unconscious." 2 3 On the other hand, the source of
attraction is viewed as tending toward a rational foundation. Partly,
it is the awareness of external force that encourages and coerces lawful
attitudes and behavior for primarily utilitarian reasons that can be
accounted for in terms of behavioristic (stimulus-response) psychology."
Professor Olivecrona has presented an exciting psychological
theory. It is also one that encourages much speculation, in search of
fuller substance, and much skepticism, seeking some firmer indications
of validity and consistency. The particular process by which law affects
the individual, the crux of Professor Olivecrona's jurisprudential thesis,
is the matter that is the most open to study. One may reasonably ask,
how, in fact, do psychological processes, i.e., ideation and emotion,
bring law into focus and operate in the individual personality. Is consciousness of law as substantial as Professor Olivecrona suggests and
does it in truth operate directly as a force taken from an essentially
intellectualized view of social reality transmitted impersonally to the
consciousness of the individual? Clearly, Professor Olivecrona is
travelling pioneer psychological territory in this formulation. Is the
rule of law vested with the element of strong and certain psychological
symbolism, as he suggests and, were it so, is it of such strength as to
22. See BRENNER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 25-40; see also HENDRICK, op. cit.
supra note 13, particularly 150-66. The basic and original reference in Freud is
contained the THE EGo AND THE ID (1923).
23. See JUNG, Two ESSAYS ON ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY, particularly 67-82,

94-115 (Baynes transl. 1928).
24. See mention of "stimulus-response" (learning) theory and references thereto
in connection with the analysis of Professor Ross' psychological views at pp.

478-80 infra.
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activate an urgency of thought and action? These are the questions
that may be posed and must be answered before Professor Olivecrona's
psychological thesis regarding law can be taken comfortably.
ALF

Ross

The psychological man of Professor Alf Ross I misses the complexity of Professor Olivecrona's formula. With some uncertainty,
however, this may be only a deceptive appearance for those readers
who, like this one, are limited to English translations of Professor
Ross' work.
Professor Ross' views appear to be singular in that he argues the
psychological personality of man from what is prerequisite in a theory
of law. Thus, he states as his first premise that "the science of law is
a branch of the doctrine of human behaviour, therefore the legal phenomenon must be found within the field of psycho-physical phenomena
constituting the domain of psychology and sociology." 2" There follows
the conviction that "the natural starting-point for the delimitation is to
be found in the existing theory of law, the method being to examine
what realitiesnust be assumed to underlie the rationalizations developed
in this." '

Conceivably, if Professor Ross took as his point of departure for
psychological interpretation some other experience than that which
relates to law, he might wish to change his formulations. On the other
hand, it rings true that while the content of social experience might
vary the formal view man takes of reality, the basic psychological processes involved in experiencing reality might be one and the same. In
order to give substantial weight to Professor Ross' psychological
theories the latter assumption must be made.
In Ross' view, man's attitudes, dispositions and, presumably, his
actions, are the product of social learning. A prevailing social order
tends to crystallize most experience in particular terms. The result,
for the individual, is habit formation founded in the repetitive qualities
and views that orderly social processes give to individual experience.
Repetitions in experience and reinforcement of meaning and effect over
a period of time crystallize habits to a point where the latter, rather than
influences in external reality, largely underlie the course of behavior.
Habit becomes transfixed within the individual into a symbolic manifestation, taking the form of personal "conviction." 28 Implicitly, the
25. See particularly Ross, ToWARD A REALisTIc JUIISPRUDENCE (1946).
is his most complete jurisprudential tract in English.
26. Id. at 78.
27. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

28. See id. at 87.

It
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latter is a determinative factor in behavior and governs individual behavior tendencies. The individual acquires a "disinterested behaviour
attitude having the stamp of validity" 29 (social acceptability or practice).
In its connectedness to law, habit based upon regularities in social
experience and symbolized in the form of "convictions" is the basis of
"moral attitudes." It is these latter that generate much of the behavior
tendency and response the individual gives to law-related matters.
Merely customary social processes do not render all human experience consistent and regular in nature and meaning. This Professor
Ross recognizes in terms of "a possibility of no small individual
divergencies," " and, because of this, law in his formulations is given
a more explicit role in human behavior. Matters for experience which
lack a personal commitment in terms of certain moral attitude are
resolved in terms of law. Cognizance of law as a coercive force, capable
of compelling particular behavior, provides the second basis of disposition and behavior in Ross' theory. He refers to "an interested behaviour
attitude, more precisely determined as an impulse of fear of compulsion." 1 That which the individual does not adequately experience so
as to evolve in terms of habit and conviction, is given a determined
meaning and value in the words, actions and structure of law. The
individual accepts the particular meaning and value because of the
coercive influence that lies behind it. At the same time, this reinforces
and enlarges a general law responsiveness which the individual derives
from his "moral attitude."
Between the experience of custom and the effect of law, the
individual's choice of attitude and response in social reality is made
complete.
Professor Ross carries his psychological thesis one further step.
He emphasizes the "inductive interaction between these two factors
[law and custom or, in personal terms, "interested behaviour attitude"
and "disinterested behavior attitude"] in such a way that the existence
of the former tends to cause and stabilize the existence of the latter, and
vice versa." 32 Acceptance of the law by the individual is a basic "moral
attitude" conditioned and reinforced by the order and regularity arising
from social experience. On the other hand, that order and regularity
is to some extent determined and explained by the words, actions and
structure of law reinforced as they are by the availability and exercise
of force.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

78.
87.
78.
78-79.
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The individual generally undergoes regularities in his experience
which lead to personal habits and "convictions." At the same time,
law tends to resolve uncertainties in experience so as to generate habits
and "convictions." The individual fears the coercion of the law and
therefore tends to respond according to its terms, but he has also acquired the habit of obeying the law and reinforces this habit by observing
the latter.
It is only the analytical framework that suggests independent
sources in personal and social experience and attitude. The sources
are, in fact, mutually dependent and cannot be identified as independently based and independently operative. Law and custom, or, in
personalized terms, "interested behavior attitude" and "disinterested
behavior attitude," have the relationship of chicken and egg.
As it best appears, Professor Ross offers a complete social determinism to account for individual behavior. The individual is entirely
the product of the filtration of social processes. In the narrower terms
of his own definitional framework, concerned specifically with lawrelated behavior, "behaviour attitude [is] evoked by social suggestion
and the Pavlovian conditioning of reflexes." '
Conditioning is a basic term, a basic process, in learning theory.
It is, in fact, an important habitude of experimental psychology, so much
of which pursues knowledge of the learning process. It is a characteristic of theories of learning that they only aspire to account for complex
personal attitudes and actions, as in social situations, though theorists
have developed essential apparatus for the purpose.3 4 The theory of
learning that advances most closely to an account of substantial behavior
is in the credit of the late Professor Clark Hull. 5 Its own theoretical
forebear is largely Pavlovian conditioning and its central concept is
habit. Hull's is a complex set of deductions and postulates. In its
most primitive essentials it takes into account sources of ability, drive
and motivation within the individual. It notes with elaborate distinction the cues and stimuli that create a state of awareness and incite or
direct behavior. It postulates with particularity the connection between
awareness and subsequent behavior that accounts for regularity and
habit, and states a basis for the explanation and prediction of personal
action and attitudes. In terms of this basic sketchwork, Professor
33. Id. at 86.
34. A fairly elementary presentation, analysis and critique of extant learning
theories is given in readable form by Professor Ernest Hilgard. See HILGARD,
See also the more advanced analysis of
THEORIES OF LEARNING (2d ed. 1956).
major learning theories in ESTES, MODERN LEARNING THEORY (1954).
35. See HuIL, A BEHAVIOR SYSTEM (1952) ; ESSENTlALS OF BEHAVIOR (1951);
PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR (1943). A layman who proceeds to the reading of Hull

should do so with trepidation. He does not address himself to the general reader.
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Hull's theories differ from those of other estimable modern learning
theorists only in that they are more complete, more extensively developed and give greater and clearer articulation to each of the essentials
-of learning. It is with respect to the development of the concept of
drive, and speculation as to its variety and sources, that modern learning
theory differs essentially from Pavlovian conditioning and, unintentionally perhaps, from the now primitive, more familiar behavioristic
formulations of John B. Watson.36
Professor Ross appears to be on the same track as the learning
theorists though, in his enthusiasm for his psychological interpretations,
he has failed to give us the benefit of an accounting concerning the
steps by which the interpretations came about. Psychological elaboration in a jurisprudential tract is a burdensome detail and one can
properly fit in interstices in formulation with available and familiar
knowledge. That is, one can if one has all the sufficient elements of
theory in bolder outlines. The social stimulus to behavior, the development of habits and patterns of behavior through a process of
social reward and punishment continually reinforced, is bold to see in
Professor Ross' theory, though only in general terms. What is notably
lacking is a concept of energy and drive that at least initially underlies
and propels behavior, some notion of individual substance or experience
that sets one man apart from others. As is, man appears as a responsive
agency but for no cause or reason beyond the mechanical application of
social forces.
Professor Ross' psychological man seems strikingly a psychological
oddity whose identity is lost in social processes. Lacking is an urge to
experience, a sensate structure of personality that differentiates man
from his environment and gives him personal integrity, a person whose
identity can be established in terms of some characteristics of individuality.
Taken as a real live specimen, Professor Ross' entity of man is not
wholly convincing. It passes too easily as an incidental by-product to
some larger framework of interest and theory that purports only to
assume, without attempting to know, what sort of creature psychological
man is. Professor Ross has said as much. 7 Stretching his thought so
as to bind historical and psychological concepts of law, he states
"fossilised concepts [of law] can be demonstrated, and the
entire modem mentality is permeated by archaic elements, deposited, so to speak, in geological strata, so that side by side with
36. See WATSON, PSYCHOLOGY FROM THE
ed. 1924).
37. See text accompanying note 27 supra.

STANDPOINT OF A BEHAVIORIST

(2d
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elements which are the glorious sign of the victorious power of
the human spirit, we meet with forms that open perspectives down
to the darkest prehistory of mankind." 38
Professor Ross has perhaps accomplished his purpose in conciliating
historical and psychological concepts of law but, one might say, a little
too easily. He has become the prisoner of one of the most controversial
and questionable concepts of Jungian psychology, the "collective unconscious" that mysteriously ensnares the history of human experience
in the individual and operates upon personality and behavior from
afar inside the human being.3 9
ANDERS VILHELm LUNDSTEDT

The psychological theories of Professor Lundstedt 40 verge upon
anomaly in a jurisprudential setting. In their essential character they
demonstrate a greater affinity to the dominant psychiatric views of
modern times than they do to the traditional habits of thought about
psychology that seem to permeate law and jurisprudence.
Professor Lundstedt propels into the heart of his jurisprudence
a conception of man as a creature of powerful instincts and impulses,
one who is given to strong feelings and emotions that may dominate
his behavior. It is the conative influence and the emotional attitude of
man, rather than his habits of rationality and his capacity for thought,
that characterize his essential being. They mold his dispositions and
responses to his environment. The cognitive elements of personality
have only an intermediate effect in man's adaptations in life. At best,
they pale in significance next to the power and importance of instinctual
and emotional life.
Lundstedt speaks of "psychological impulses arising in various
ways from the nature of man, his senses, his instincts and his emotions.
These psychological impulses operate as mainsprings for man's actions,
and his actions in turn have a multitude of psychological as well as
material consequences." 41 In what seems to be the most proper interpretation of the term "impulse" as it is used here, it consists of dispositions to behavior deriving from man's biological character.
There are but adumbrations on the intelligibility of these biological
forces. Apparently, some instincts, at least, have a sociable temperament. Professor Lundstedt refers to "powerful moral instincts"
38. Ross, op. cit. supra note 25, at 15.
39. See authority cited note 23 supra.
40. See particularly LumsT=r,
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id. at 124.

LEGAL THINKING REVISED

(1955).
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and "infers or conjectures" that there is in man "a social or communitybuilding instinct." '
Emotion, in contradistinction to reason, is the essence of some, if
not all, experience, and reason without an attached emotion either may
or must be sham. Thus, quoting Professor Lundstedt, "the significance
of the abstract legal conceptions of the common sense of justice lies
in their power to call forth feelings in agreement with their contents.
[O]ne cannot believe in the reality of what one says if this is
not supported by the feelings." 4" Put roundabout, a common sense of
justice represents one value judgment and, Lundstedt notes, value
judgments are expressions of feelings.
The role of cognitive skill in Professor Lundstedt's thesis is to
provide conception as a cue and a more definable basis for emotional
expression. "The feeling [of value] is directly brought to life .
by the person's conception [of the thing of value]." " "It is our very
conceptions of reality which lead to those feelings for which the value
judgments are expressions." 41 Emotion apparently becomes animate
through the operation of powers of reason, and it is not clear whether
feeling is or is not included in the process.
Though man's instincts and emotions provide his essential energy
and disposition, Professor Lundstedt observes that these are harnessed
to, used by and even come to serve law and social life. "The group life
of our species is made possible by 'law.' In point of fact 'law' is an
intricate machinery which is essentially kept going .

psychological impulses."

'7

.

. by means of

And, at another point,

"[there is] pressure on the conduct of man brought about-thanks
to certain reactions effected with a certain regularity on a number
of modes of conduct-partly through conscious feelings of duty in
the person acting and partly through powerful moral instincts in
him engendered immediately through the socio-psychical pressure
from the entire environment's collected feelings of duty in respect
to [particular] conduct." 41
Apparently, the pressure of social force is brought to bear on man's
consciousness, on the one hand, and also directly upon his instincts
without passing through consciousness, on the other.
Only enough of Professor Lundstedt's psychological thinking is
available to suggest the boldest outlines of his theory. These are
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 128.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 124.

1959]

PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWS IN JURISPRUDENCE

sufficient to identify Professor Lundstedt in terms of kinship with psychoanalytic traditions, at least in his emphasis on both instinctual and
emotional life. In his emphasis on the importance of emotions in
behavior he particularly shares the predilections of virtually all psychiatry.
It is in the development and details of his theory that Professor
Lundstedt either deviates from his psychological fellows or fails to
make clear his relationship to them. Lundstedt finds, where the psychoanalysts generally do not, that some instincts, at least, have aims parallel
and consonant with political and social objectives. Either because of
these instincts, or the powerful burden of social experience, or because of
some other unarticulated basis of faith, Professor Lundstedt seems
quite sanguine in his view that man's instinctual life and emotional
dispositions for the most part bend naturally and easily in the direction
of law and social order. However, this may only be a deceptive implication resulting from a lack of detail in Professor Lundstedt's theory.
In fact, it is in the seeming embellishments that one could have learned
from Professor Lundstedt how, if he meant it, instincts experience social
reality without the latter passing through consciousness. How, in
other words, is instinct expressed other than in terms of feelings that
are related through some process of consciousness. And what, in
clearer terms, is the fuller relationship of feeling and thought.
Professor Lundstedt's general thesis is provocative, if only because
of its radical departure from more typical views of psychology that
exist explicitly or implicitly in jurisprudence. However, it is in the
substance of its detail that the earliest test of its probity lies.
AXEL HKGERSTR6M

The preceptor of the Scandinavian psychological jurisprudents,
Professor Axel Higerstr6m, materializes the basic viewpoint of the
group. The essence of law is not its identity and characterization in
social and physical reality but its phenomenal qualities as a part of the
psychological processes of man. He begins with the proposition that
there are a
"series of feelings, propagated by inheritance through thousands
of years, which are attached to rules for the community. ..
This group of feelings is of two kinds: it consists partly of feelings
of duty in regard to the restrictions which affect one, and partly
of specially intense feelings of power in regard to the acquisition
of advantages which the rules of law assign to one-self and which
are regarded as rights." "
49. HAGERSTR61,,
crona ed. 1953).

INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND MORALS
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There is postulated in addition a third feeling, operative when an
individual is involved in the infringement of another's rights, "fear of
reaction from one's neighbors." "
These feelings are conceived to be the mortar of the law. As
Professor Hgerstr6m puts it in grandiloquent fashion, "And so the
whole legal machinery works, driven by a mighty complex of feelings,
which function independently of the views on what laws ought to be
established." "
Duty, in Professor H.gerstri5m's view, is a state of consciousness
within the individual, 52 more correctly identified as a "feeling of duty."
It is "a conative feeling .

.

. a feeling of being driven to act in a

certain way." " Further, "the impulse imposes itself on us, no matter
what evaluatory attitudes we may take towards the action." 5'
-igerstr~m expressly rejects the view that a feeling of duty is the
result of a fear of personal consequences, or of a standard and value
that stands without the individual and transfixes itself upon him.5 The
feeling of duty appears to be a powerful drive or instinct, existing or
conditioned beyond the quick reach of reason and, as such, a prime
mover of man's conscience."
Reduced to terms of finer analysis, the feeling of duty consists of
the "simultaneous association" of different states of consciousness,
notably the "association of a feeling of impulse and the idea of an action,
in which the former receives its special expression." 7 The feeling and
the idea are coordinated by means of language. Language, and notably
the indicative form of sentence in which the concept of duty takes place,
evokes the association. The sentence in the indicative form is a "reflex
which arises unconditionally from the underlying state of consciousness," 58 and is similarly experienced by a large group of persons because
of their membership in "a social linguistic community." " It is language
which connects the "feeling of impulse" with an "idea of action" that is
representative of the action itself. As Professor Hdigerstr6m further
explains, "the idea of the determinate character of the action is predominant at the time when the speech reflex operates, and it forcibly
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Ibid.
Ibid.
See id. at 127.
Id. at 130.
Ibid.
See id. at 128-30.
See id. at 131-32.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 138.
Ibid.
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inserts the expression of the feeling into the expression of the determinate character of the action." 0
"Conative impulses," the enervating drives that produce the feeling
of duty, emanate from two sources: command and habit. 1 The psychic
potency of command relates in large part to the influence command holds
over the individual because of his early and continuous experience with
authority. Professor Hfgerstr5m cites, as predispositional to the
individual's response to command generally, his experience with parental authority, with law, with religion, and the like 2 There exists
between the commanding party and the commanded "special relations
*

a superiority in power on the part of the former which makes

the latter susceptible to his influence." '
The long term cultivation of response to command, induced at
least partly by the painful effects resulting from a failure to obey,'
results in an unconditional tendency to compliance with the requirements of a statement issued in the imperative. "An expression in the
imperative .

.

. effects an association between a feeling of conative

impulse and the idea of a certain action." 05 In effect, it creates a feeling
of duty, "an intention to act in a certain way." 00 The imperative may
arouse the "idea of a certain action .

.

.

and repress all conflicting

ideas" 07 where the relations between the parties are clearly superordinate-subordinate. Where no conflicting ideas exist the imperative
merely reinforces and activates a prevailing view and tendency."
Where there are such, "the imperative form acquires its peculiar meaning." It is utilized "to suppress the tendency of these impulses [ideas]
to materialize in actual intentions, by producing through the imperative
form an intention to carry out the action commanded." 69
Habit, the second source of "feelings of duty," appears not to be
substantially different from command. In his analysis, Professor
Hfigerstrbrm conceives of habit in terms of custom and ascribes to the
latter the force and influence of command in a person's behavior.7" The
possibility of competition between the commanding influence of custom
and of authority is recognized though it is Hdgerstr5m's view that, in
60. Id. at 135.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 152.
See id. at 153.
Id. at 120-21.
See id. at 153.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 120.
Ibid.
Id. at 121.
Ibid.
Id. at 122.
See id. at 155.
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advanced societies, commanding authority tends to predominate over
custom in "forming the system of conduct." "' He notes that where
the two, custom and authority, are coordinate, the individual is better
able to evolve a correct standard of behavior (i.e., call forth an appropriate "feeling of duty") for most, including idiosyncratic, situations.
This ability is the mark of "the development of moral consciousness." 72
Feelings of duty, then, are a resultant of feelings (of power)
associated with command. However, they are differentiated in that
feelings in relation to command exist only in terms of some immediate
interpersonal relationship in which one party is presumably known to
be clearly in power, and they are aided by the emotional impact of the
imperative form of language. Feelings more strictly connected with
duty, on the other hand, operate and exist independently of personal
direction and appear to be the proximate result of the psychological
power and skill of the symbolic forms of language itself. Feelings of
duty appear as a more advanced and permanent form of civilized conception of law. Feelings in relation to command appear to hold more
native power.
Another element of Professor Hiigerstrbm's psychological formulation is his explanation of a differently oriented basic feeling in
relation to law, the "fear of reaction from one's neighbors." " The
latter feeling results, not from the observation and experience of the
effects of improper behavior, but from powerful impulses independent
of the latter and bound to the feeling of duty. The feeling of duty
regarding one's own behavior contains one's idea of the "rightness of
an action." This "rightness of action," in Hagerstrbm's view, applies
equally to oneself and to others."4 In conceptual terms, there exists
"a feeling of conative impulse, devoid of valuation, in respect of another
person's action as right." 75 On this account, there exists what is
commonly known as moral indignation and the basis for the demand
7 6 When the
upon others to respect one's own and another's rights
"rightness" of an action is not respected, and a right has been infringed,
7 The
it is the analogue of a feeling of duty that has been violated.
spontaneous reaction to the disesteem and moral reaction that results
is a feeling of anger. Further, the cumulative recognition that commanding authority exacts reparations, learned in connection with the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 156.
Id. at 156-57.
See text accompanying note 50 mipra.
See H.GFERSTR6M, op. cit. mopra note 49, at 170.
Id. at 171.
See id. at 172-73.
See id. at 171-72.
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development of the feeling of duty, gives rise to the idea "that one
ought to make reparation for damage .

. if claimed," " and to the

.

idea "that compulsion will be exerted, if reparation is not made voluntarily." 79 The psychological process in the feeling of justice is identical
with that of the feeling of duty to which it is linked. There is "a feeling
of conative impulse, devoid of valuation, linked with [the idea of
justice]." 80

"The idea of compulsion .

.

. is [of] something owed

by the wrong-doer." s The ideas of justice that are involved are
essentially revengeful in character, 2 though they may be attuned to
social needs and interests. 83 At base, they emanate from the instantaneous feelings of anger that are exhibited toward a failure to observe the
rightness of an action. The feelings of anger, taking the form of
aggressive counter-action, are self-preservative in character. In the
form of measured self-preservation, where they do not constitute a mere
reflex action, they underlie the demand for suffering and the ideas of
justice which Hdigerstr6m describes.'I
Basically, the feeling of "fear of reaction from one's neighbors"
appears to represent that others, as well as oneself, bear similar "feelings of duty." Secondly, the violation of feelings of duty results in
feelings of disapproval and revenge, with concomitant effects, that can
occur with equal spontaneity in others as well as in oneself. The latter
is a troubled or uncomfortable feeling with unpleasant effects, a kind of
feeling that one seeks to avoid, perhaps more notably as it is held and
applied by others.
While at first Professor Hdgerstr6m makes mention of "feelings
propagated by inheritance," 85 his prevailing view seems to be that man,
through processes of conditioning that occur early and continuously,
acquires drives of a particular sort. The conditioning influences are
experiences with authority and with convention. The resulting drives
take the form of powerful anticipatory responses, conditioned so that
they function autonomously and without reason, in the face of expressive authority. The anticipatory response is in the nature of a
feeling of duty and contemplates compliant action. Intervening between the feeling and the contemplation of action is the symbolism of
language. Language acts as a catalyst, having the ultimate effect of
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 177.
Ibid.
Id. at 179.
Ibid.

82. See id. at 188.

83. See id. at 178, 182.
84. See id. at 188-91.
85. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
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connecting emotion to thought so as to impel action. The connecting
process is not deliberate but seems to occur in the form of a mechanical
association.
Professor Higerstr6m views the above-mentioned drive as common to humanity. Through it there apparently evoke the keen senses
of obligation or prerogative that are, inferably at least, so nearly the
converse of one another. When the drive fails to appear, notably in
others, there are instant discomfort and attendant feelings of anger.
Further, earlier conditioning in relation to authority creates the
expectation that, when this situation arises, authority will exact an
ounce of flesh from the deviate, if the latter fails to make suitable amends
himself. The response of authority is viewed as essential to preserve
and maintain the character and presumably the intensity of the drive
in the rest of humanity.
Professor Hiigerstr6m would probably find a very comfortable
place in the den of the learning theorist.8 6 Learning is the hallmark of
his thought about the law. It is the inductiveness leading from experiences in his social environment, and the constant and consistent
reinforcement of experience, that lead to man's dispositions and behavior in relation to the law. The latter take on the form and intensity of a drive. At the same time, Iigerstr6m emphasizes the importance of an influence that is more familiar and better known to a
variety of psychoanalytic thinkers, the cardinal importance of authority
in shaping behavior.5 7 And then, finally, Hd.gerstrb3m's recognition of
the importance of the symbolic process as a psychological element
identifies him with the community of individuals who stress the
psychological role of language and of communication in the evolution
and explanation of behavior."' Language, by many of these individuals,
is seen as a form of psychological expression, reflecting and inducing a
frequently predictable variety of psychological and behavioral reactions.89

The largest difficulty with Professor HEigerstr6m's theory is in
the accounting for deviancy. Since feelings in relation to duty are
so intense and pervasive an element in human experience, and seemingly
are a universal characteristic in man's behavior, one may inquire as
to the basis for any deviation. There is in this question an implication
that HIigerstr6m's theory, to be useful, must better delineate the psy86. See notes 34, 35 suPra and accompanying text.

87. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
88. See particularly KoRzyBsia, SCIENCE AND

SANITY (1933); cf. MoRRIs,
SIGNS, LANGUAGE AND BEHAVIOR (1946) ; SAPiR, LANGUAGE AND PERSONALITY (1949).

89. In this connection, see the learning theorists' approach to language, as in
OSGOOD, THE MEASUREMENT OF MEANING (1957).
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chological characteristics that attach to any range or kind of social experience. In effect, this is almost at the beginning of any psychological
theory of behavior that takes as an important element the influence of
social reality, and the theory can have only limited moment without it.
Somewhat along the same point one would inquire what other
drives of man achieve some appurtenance to his law-related dispositions
and behavior. As Professor Higerstr6m presents his thesis, behavior
connected with law seems to be the outgrowth of only one kind of
disposition and one general type of situation operating essentially in
isolation and without competition from other areas or experience of
personality.
And then, lastly, one wonders about the purely mechanical nature
of the process that enfaces one with law. Particularly, are linguistic
symbols mere automatic conduits or is their choice and operation a
more complicated matter?
Like his Scandinavian brethren, Professor Hdgerstrbm has much
to say and still more to answer.
LEON PETRAZYCKI

The polymorphic psychology of the Scandinavians evinces a
common faith, that law is neither an external nor a by-product in man's
most intimate experiences. In fact, law appears as a fundament of
individual human growth and behavior, so much so that it is indistinguishable as an independent property. It may be reasonably specific
in appearance but it seems often not to be clearly separated from the
variety of man's inclinations and the general pattern of his social
behavior.
Joining in the essential faith that law is, at bottom, a psychological
phenomenon, is the Polish law professor and contemporary of the
Scandinavians, Leon Petrazycki. In Petrazycki's own phraseology,
"Legal phenomena consist of unique psychic processes expressed in the
unique form of ascribing to different beings, or to certain classes of
such beings, 'duties' and 'rights.' " 9
Stressing the need for "a scientific concept of law," 91 Professor
Petrazycki would plumb the psychic processes in order to identify and,
in turn, to classify legal phenomena. His image of science is in the
Aristotelian tradition of "developing proper concepts of different
classes of objects," 92 through the orderly arrangement of facts relating
90. Pm-Azycxi,
id. at 6-12.
91. Id. at 3.
92. Ibid.

LAW

AND

MORALITY 8

(Babb transl. 1955).

See generally
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to these objects. 93 His selected method of study is essentially "selfobservation: the introspective method," 11 "the proper, and the only
possible, method of observing legal phenomena." 9'
Professor Petrazycki premises that only man, of all creatures, is
"distinguished by the capacity to experience the complicated psychic
processes which constitute legal phenomena." '6 Further, "the capacity
to experience psychic processes of the legal type . . . emerges only
with the attainment of a certain level of culture. . . . Only those
persons who have attained a certain age, and been subjected to certain
educative influences, have that capacity." " The capacity, barring
physical or psychic defect, occurs fairly early, before coming of legal
98
age.
With the assertion of this foundation of belief, Petrazycki next
offers an original blueprint of psychological experience. There appear
to be two fundamental dimensions in his schema. 9 Psychological experience is, firstly, either "unilateral" or "bilateral." The apparent
distinction is that the unilateral type involves the sensitivities and
inclinations of the experiencing organism, with only incidental reference
to the role of the surrounding environment and the effect upon it. In
"bilateral" experience a stronger contemplation of the organism in
relation to its environment is afforded. It would include, either tacitly
or by direction, expectations, demands and obligations that are to be
met and satisfied in relation to objects of the individual's surrounding
environment, and are comprehended as important to both the individual
and the environment.
Secondly, psychological experience is of two varieties, either "passive" or "active." Reference. to "passive" experiences suggests that
what is meant is that individuals merely receive and register, and react
their awareness to whatever is taking place. In "active" experience, the
individual is inclined to go further and utilize motive and will to
extend or enlarge what is happening.
Feelings, meaning pleasures and sufferings, are "unilater al-passive"
in Professor Petrazycki's blueprint.' ° "Will experiences," such as
"the will to work regardless of fatigue," are "unilateral-active ex93. Cf. text at pp. 493-95 infra.
94. PETRAZYCxI, op. cit. upra note 90, at 13.
95. Ibid.
96. Id. at 12.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. See id. at 22-24.
100. See id. at 22.
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periences." 0l Hunger, thirst and sex excitation Petrazycki classifies
as "passive-active, bilateral experiences." 102

Advancing his fairly elaborate lexicon one further step, Petrazycki
refers to all phenomena of a "bilateral passive-active nature" as "impulsions." 103 "Impulsions act as the principal and directing psychic
factors of adaptation to the conditions of life." 10" It is primarily in
the realm of the impulsions that one is to make significant findings
regarding legal phenomena.
"Impulsions," the well-springs of human action, are distinguished
by a great diversity of source and quantity. Highly sensitive and
elastic in the face of experience, their intensities vary with the character
of the events they undergo. °5 They serve hedonistic designs but may
equally well serve utilitarian or other purposes.' 6 Though sometimes
deliberate and purposive to an immediate circumstance, they may, for
example, reflect a nearly automatic response aroused by past purposes
and experience.' 0 7 They may reflect the established association between
particular behavior and specific objects and events, to the degree that
the pertinent behavior occurs virtually reflexively. 0 " Furthermore,
and of particular note in the area of moral and legal behavior, they
may represent instantaneous value judgments aroused by particular
behavior and lending themselves to unambiguous thoughts and actions
of a clear-cut ethical quality.' 0 The judgments, presumably, mostly
align themselves in normative fashion, and are referred to by Professor
Petrazycki as nornative judgments3'0
It is Petrazycki's thesis that moral and legal situations provide
the instance for a set of impulsions-experiences of duty and obligation
-which he describes as ethical impulsions,"' impulsions that are
"unilateral-imperative" (moral) or "imperative-attributive" (legal)."2
It is these, operating normatively but as yet largely unidentified, that
largely influence our behavior in the legal and moral situations.
Professor Petrazycki would advance the science of law on the
psychological framework that he has outlined. He proposes to apply
101.
102.
103.
104.

Ibid.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23.
Ibid.

105. See id. at 24.
106. See id. at 28.
107. See id. at 28-29.
108. See id. at 29-30.

109. See id. at 30.
110. Ibid.
111. Id. at 35.
112. See id. at 49.
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the method of introspection to sample ethical response inclinations, or
impulsions, in situations "in the field of duty consciousness." 113 The
character and intensity of ethical impulsions could thus be assessed and,
he feels, could be done so with great skill and certainty where the
situations to be judged arouse conflict or provocation and bring to
the fore more clearly the contending ethical value." 4 Since ethical
impulsions offer a particularly strong constraint upon overt behavior," their identification is of great moment to an understanding
of the character and operation of legal processes.
In the compass of Professor Petrazycki's theory, ethical impulsions, of both the legal and moral denominations, embrace a broader
scope of experience than may meet the eye. They are to be found, in
the instance of law, not only in relation to formal and official authority,
decision and institutions but also in a variety of experiences that are
usually not connected with law. The playing of games," 0 the
observance of rules of courtesy and etiquette,1 7 intimate relationships
that generally fall outside of the scope of legal regulation,"' provide
additional instances where "law," in Petrazycki's sense, operates. In
fact, any situation or relationship where an individual feels something
in the nature of a compulsion or obligation to behave in a particular
way toward certain others and objects in his environment affords an
ethical experience and the basis for detecting ethical impulsions. There
is, further, differentiation in detail between the psychological meanings
and consequences of "unilateral-imperative" (moral) experiences and
"imperative-attributive" (legal) experiences." 9
The powerful intuitive bent in Professor Petrazycki's concepts
and theories relating to law is plain to see. Experience of an exceptional
variety is the touchstone for the issuance of "impulsions" or tendencies
to respond that take on a certain and definite character. Impulsions,
particularly the legal variety, are a large, if somewhat cryptic, force
in man's personality and behavior. They define his intellectual attitudes
and may also guide his more demonstrative behavior. They are the
bedrock on which a highly articulate, orderly and successful conception
of law, formal or otherwise, can be built. And the conception is for
the taking if one will adapt the appropriate method, in this instance
introspection, for their detection and study.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 36.
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See id. at
See id. at
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Petrazycki's theory seems a fusion of the newer and the older
fashioned psychology. His genius sensed and applied a tradition of the
twentieth century, with its emphasis on the important role of the
elements external to the individual (the environment) in inducing and
perhaps molding behavior. Simultaneously, the flavor of the nineteenth
century "faculty" psychology ' also afflicted his thought. His notion
that impulsions are discretely organized in terms of character, have and
maintain clearly separable identities, and then compete with one another
within the individual is the tacit evidence of an older view in psychology.
Professor Petrazycki's consciousness of method and stern desire
for the rigorous acquisition of knowledge, carefully traced to its source
for validity, give him the stamp of a scientist that is not a familiar
quality among his jurisprudent brothers. But the anomaly of his
thinking does not hold only in comparison to his legal fraternity. His
cardinal concept of behavior, "impulsion," has the intuitive flavor
associated with some psychiatric and psychological theories of behavior.
Freud's is the most notable in this respect, and Professor William
McDougall's, with its emphasis on a variety of "social instincts," 121 is
another worthy of mention here. Yet his penchant for systematic experiment will permit his identification with the school of psychologists,
most notably students of learning behavior, whose hallmark is empiricist
methodology and rigor. And finally, adding to the singularity of
thought, Professor Petrazycki's preferred method of study, introspection, identifies him with Titchener's long-discarded emphasis on a simiIt does not connect him with the
lar method by a similar name.'
higher development of empirical methods that is associated with the
learning psychologists, nor with the particular observational methods
of such as the Freudians, who developed free association to study
elements of consciousness.
Petrazycki's psychological concoction is the stranger and the more
remarkable if, as it appears, his situation and station in eastern Europe
might have contributed to his isolation from burgeoning developments
in psychology in the rest of the world about and after the turn of the
twentieth century. Remarkable as the case may be, though, it is not
the heterodoxy that provides the difficulty with Petrazycki's thought.
One would want to know much more about the concept of "impulsions,"
120. See text infra and at pp. 494-95 infra.
121. See McDouGALL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 20-93 (15th ed.

1923).

122. For a brief description and discussion of the Titchenarian "school" of the
turn of the twentieth century, one may consult a highly readable treatise on the
varieties of psychological thought: HEIDBREDER, SEVEN PsYCHOLOwGS (1933), or a
more recently revised presentation of schools of psychological thought, WOOnWORTH,
CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY

(rev. ed. 1948).

494

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

whether they are biological, social or metaphysical in basis, what is
the range of their character, and their relationship to one another, and
more of the circumstances that make for their change and adaptation
to events. As it stands, the concept seems mostly heuristic and invites
but limited confidence that there are real life equivalents for the concept
of "impulsions." Since the classification of impulsions is the essence,
and seemingly most of what there is in Petrazycki's psychological
underpinnings for law, his theory rests almost squarely on the validity
of this single concept.
Most easily preserved in Professor Petrazycki's thought, ironically
perhaps, is his emphasis on validity in defining and observing the
character of law. His own psychological explanations relating to law
lack evidence or amplification to demonstrate that they have merit. Yet,
he emphasizes the need for the systematic accumulation of evidence as
a basis for knowing the full nature and character of law.
Scandinavian jurisprudential psychology, particularly, and Petrazycki's to a lesser extent, share the bias of all modern psychology. It
seeks the explanation of behavior in terms of intertwining sets of
operations distributed in time. It is, in a term, process-oriented, in the
traditions of science dating from Galileo. For the most part, it is
emotional capacities, connected with intellectual and ethical dispositions
because of and in the course of each individual's social experience, that
govern man's law-abidingness and his relation to law. Law has meaning only as it reflects and relates to man's capacities, his dispositions
and his intimate experience.
Sharply contrastive is the kind of psychology that generally
permeates the law. Jeremy Bentham may be taken as the sovereign
exponent of the view. System, for behavior, is a matter of fixed
properties in the individual. Behavior is meaningful only in terms of
effects, and declension into an encyclopedia of behavior elements serves
as analysis. The scientific tradition is that mostly identified with an
earlier period, beginning with Aristotle. The purely descriptive technique assists classification and serves better as a means to the immediate
judgment of behavior than as an aid toward its prediction. Intellectual and moral skills and knowledge are recognized as the eminent and powerful sources of behavior, though Bentham, for one,
owned to the need for a larger study and classification of "the will." '"
The conceptual arrangements between law and behavior are the product
of the drawing board, ordered in terms of logic, symmetry, or arithmetic. They are based on articles of faith concerning man, that he
123.
1823).

See BENTHAM,

PRINCIPLES OF MOLLS AND LEGISLATION at xiii (rev.

ed.
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possesses a moral faculty which guides and controls his behavior, that
his native dispositions are law-abiding or, at the very least, that his intelligence, narrowly construed in terms of intellect, recognizes the merit
of observing the law. It is psychological subsumption of this kind that
settles a relationship between man and law. In a purely conceptual
sense, however, man and law are entities apart.
JEREMY BENTHAM

Bentham's psychological man is born to the mold of the older
psychological tradition. Appraised solely in terms of the effects of his
behavior, man is governed by an ethic, Bentham's particular ethic
being postulated in psychological terms. It is the familiar "principle of
utility," " "that principle which approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in
question." ' And so, "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure." 126 The variety
of pleasures and pains are separately catalogued,'1 7 denominated in such
terms as (the pleasure or pain of) the senses, amity or enmity, skill or
awkwardness, piety, and the like, and are given genesis in the flow of
physical, political, moral and religious sanctions.128
Pains and pleasures are viewed as "interesting perceptions" 129
and "the disposition which anyone has to feel such or such a quantity
of pleasure or pain .

.

. is what we term the degree or quantum of

Sensibilities are subject to individual differences
his sensibility."
resulting from a variety of influences. These latter are separately
identified and catalogued as physical and mental structure, body integrity and strength, characteristic intelligence and knowledge, established moral and social sensitivities and biases, habits and regular activities, interest in and accumulation of wealth, and established patterns
of social preferences. These in turn are catalytic agents for such additional influences as age, sex, education, social position, and the like.''
The concern of law is, at best, only remotely with man's sensibilities. It more directly recognizes the social effects of his behavior
and weighs these in terms of carefully circumscribed physical and psy'30

124. Id. at 1.
125. Id. at 2.
126. Id. at 1.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 33-42.
See id. at 24-28.
See id. at 33.
Id. at 44.
See id. at 43-69, and

particularly Bentham's own summary at 68-69.
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chological circumstances attending human actions of legal consequence.
Act and circumstance, intentionality and consciousness, and, to a
lesser extent, general disposition and specific motive are the conceptual matter with which law views and characterizes man's behavior.
The perspective is more deliberately attuned to the needs of legislative
mechanics than to the realities of human behavior. Acts and circumstances are given simple logical definition."3 Intentionality refers
to the purpose of the particular behavior (act), as it is determined by
its proximity to the latter, and as it may be logically inferred from and
contemplated by the consequences of the act. 13 Consciousness refers
only to the correctness and the completeness of social perceptions, as
recognized in thought, that are relevant to the behavior and circumstances involved."* Motive refers to "anything that can contribute to
give birth to, or even to prevent, any kind of action" ' in a "thinking
Motives are entities whose classification corresponds
being." '
roughly to that of pleasures and pains.' Disposition is a moral evaluative measure of man. It is, according to Bentham, "a kind of fictitious entity, feigned for the convenience of discourse, in order to express what there is supposed to be permanent in a man's frame of
mind." "38 It is inferable from a judgment of the motive of a person's
act and of the tendency of the act to produce pleasure or pain. 3 9 Logic
in the order of a person's behavior and consistency through time are
assumed as a basis for judging a person's disposition from any particular act.14°
The aim of Bentham's psychological man is pleasure. Perceptions
of pleasure are conditioned by the dispositions resulting from the
ordered accumulation of experience and from native endowments or
faculties. From so much as is articulated in Bentham's theoretical
framework, man's consciousness consists of one dimension and that
regularly within the range of his intellectual and moral awareness.
A failure of this consciousness results, not from any primeval and
hidden forces underlying behavior, but from errors in social perception
as a result of deficiencies in social experience and in endowment. It
is the thinking apparatus, or faculty, that appears to serve man's psy132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See id. at 71-80.
See id. at 71, 82-88.
See id. at 71, 89-96.
Id. at 97.
Ibid.
See id. at 105-18.
Id. at 131.
See id. at 134-35.
See id. at 133.
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chological purpose and his moral and social inclinations, though,
interestingly, it is by feeling that he assesses the nature and quality of
experience.' 4
Bentham's "principle of utility" bears a comparison with Freud's
"pleasure principle." "= Both the political thinker and the psychologist view man's personal happiness as the guiding object in life. For
the political thinker man's pleasures are several and distinct. They
stem from the great variety of his endowments and social experience.
For the psychologist, pleasure is basically sensual. It may, however, be
delayed, detoured, disguised and diluted accordingly as the social order
and social experience of the individual produce these effects on
direct sensual and physical expressions and gratification. In Freud's
view, man struggles that he may achieve biological pleasure devoid of
contaminating social influences but, in the end, he makes his share of
compromises with social reality. Pleasures, and they become several,
diluted and diffused, take on social as well as biological forms.
In his psychological views Bentham appears to have woven the
thought of a number of students of behavior of his and an earlier
age.'4 One can detect Aristotle's emphasis on the role of the intellect,
and on its service in establishing and maintaining man's moral character. One can see the fortification of the element of reason in man's
social behavior through the influence of Iobbes. The psychological
empiricism of seventeenth and eighteenth century British scholars and
adherents also appears to have made its mark on Bentham's psychological thought. There is, most notably, Locke's and Berkeley's emphasis on the study of man's behavior in terms of the experience of the
senses, and the proposed systematic ordering of experience in highly
rational terms as afforded in the thought of Kant. These, and undoubtedly other influences, mark Bentham's psychology as the creature
and the captive of the major intellectual trends in its time.
The essence of a modem criticism of Bentham's psychological
views is that behavior does not exist but it is determined. It is the
facts, or the theories, relating to its determination that give its descriptive features meaning and probity. One would ask of Bentham
141. See quote from Bentham relating to sensibilities for pain and pleasure cited
in text accompanying note 130 mtpra..
142. See HENDicI, FAcrs AND THEoR s OF PsycaoAIA.YsIs 95-101 (3d ed.

1958).

143. The development of the study of psychology, notably through the culling of
the thought of distinguished philosophers and scholars through time, affords the best
means of viewing the evolution of ideas in the field. Bentharn's psychological thought
is best analyzed and appraised in terms of just such an effort. This can be most easily
and conveniently accomplished by reference to treatises on the history of psychology.
See particularly Banr, HisToRy oF PSYCHOLOGY (Peters ed. 1953); cf. authorities
cited note 122 supra.
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today what are the sources of the separate psychological entities of
man that vouch for their validity and integrity. What are the sources
of drive and the character of the energy that breathe life into man?
What are the characteristics and personal techniques of intellect and
emotion that further man's aims, and how are they structured and
organized? What, in more definitive terms than Bentham suggests,
are the sources of man's perceptions and how, in specific manner, do
they influence his behavior? It is by the lights of his address to these
questions that one could judge whether Bentham's psychological man
is anything more than a gratuitous set of ideas, based on the merest
speculation and perhaps attended to some degree by common sense.
Clearly, though, an injustice may rest in this latter view insofar as
Bentham is criticized for not having anticipated the questions of the
twentieth century psychology. And then, too, his psychological system
may have been only as completely presented as his theories of legislation
required. The remainder he may have too casually assumed to be a
matter of common experience and understanding or of incidental importance.
Jurisprudential penetration into psychology has been bold and
imaginative on the whole. In fact, one may say of it that it has
been venturesome, a judgment scaled on the standard of the professional psychologist. The jurisprudential offerings, adjusted to their
time, appear to have sensed some of the major intellectual dispositions
regarding human behavior as they have been reflected in the work of
major psychological theorists. In the amplification and addition,
however, there are, commonly, impressive evidences of improvisation,
drawn by the orbit of jurisprudence and characterized only in terms of
its basic interests. There is also a palpable lack of significant detail,
a lack of wherewithal to probe the psychological theory and develop or
extend a process of insight and validation.
It is, of course, true that the psychologist's reservations may be
turned on the psychologist. One may ask what right of presumption
attaches to the psychologist's theories. In fact, seeming to be cognizant
of a dearth of solid articulated information about psychological behavior, one might colorably suggest that our "basic instincts" regarding behavior are as apt as any criterion of insight and accuracy,
and one may ask whether, in point of theory, Aristotle has been substantially superseded or improved upon by the psychologist.
Drawn into issue are matters of proof and matters of faith. The
psychologist's ability to describe, manipulate and predict behavior in
the light of his theories, though acknowledged as fallible, has been
extended beyond doubt. There is generally less certainty about the
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jurisprudents' theories of behavior, even as to the purely psychological
aspects. "Basic instinct" seems an altogether naive term of reference,
or else it is sophisticated beyond understanding. And it may be said of
Aristotle that he never pursued the questions that are consensually
established as of greatest importance today in understanding and
predicting behavior, those relating to it as a process.
The direction of inquiry is clearly more proper and of greater
promise when it searches the basic proposition that law is best comprehended if it is perceived in terms of the psychology of the individual.
This reasonably seems an appropriate reductio ultimum for a wide
range of social behavior and social organization, including that relating to law. It seems comfortably certain that a total failure to
observe and to consider this proposition renders any jurisprudential
theory susceptible of being unrepresentative of life, incomplete and
possibly erroneous.
One may add, gratuitously, that reasonably valid and adequate
psychological theories of behavior are not enough. The coordination
of the theory with propositions relating to law in its different guises,
in a systematic framework, is another focus of crucial examination that
is likely to be of more engrossing interest to students of law and
jurisprudence. And then, too, a comparison of the probity of jurisprudential systems, having in mind here the psychologically oriented
systems particularly, also comes into being as a natural manifestation of
the native interests of theoretically-oriented students of law. The
undertaking of a psychological theory of jurisprudence, and even the
critical study of such alone, is something well beyond the scope here
given to the problem.
PSYCHOLOGISTS'

THEORIES

REGARDING LAW

A bit of counterpoint to what has already been presented is the
consideration of psychologists' theories relating to law. Mainly,
psychologists do not contemplate law as an integral element in behavior
theory, and it scarcely receives mention. Legal scholars given to
large measures of grace might point to the great diffusion in concepts
of law as the explanation. A grudging view, and probably the more
accurate one, is that psychologists' theories have not advanced to
the point where they are even ready to systematically differentiate the
psychological effects of particular social institutions and processes,
including law, on behavior, nor are they well prepared to develop the
converse relationship.
In the theories of Freud, for example, law, however conceived,
is only remotely an influence on behavior. It is predominantly the
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agency of conscience, and its more primitive forebearer, the superego,
that structures the individual's cognition and response to law and
morality.'" Conscience evolves out of a host of experiences with
authority of which the considerably largest number and the most
influential are fused through the identity and behavior of parents.
Law is part of this experiential mass, largely undifferentiated in its
properties, that is filtered down to the individual. The individual comes
to know it and to respond to it almost instinctively, as a representation
of the kind of authority manifest in the attitudes and actions of more
familiar and more complete parental figures.
This process of "knowing" the law is substantially consummated
and, short of drastic and complicated re-education, is largely irretrievable after the first few years of life.
Given such theory, the seemingly slight and incidental psychological significance attributable to law is not remarkable. Formal law
in any sense is hardly within the purview of most children. The
facilities for abstraction and bases of experience are lacking, except
through others.
Somewhat more relenting is the psychological view of law postulated by the English psychiatrist, Ranyard West."
Dr. West appears to stand squarely within psychoanalytic traditions in psychology,
with its emphasis on the importance of instinctual elements and on
"unconscious" processes in molding behavior. West's theoretical
position is, however, an original deviation from Freud, at least as to the
character of man's instincts and possibly as to their mode of operation.
Dr. West suggests that there are two "primary" instincts in man,
the social instinct and the aggressive instinct. 146 The social instinct
serves the "need of others" while the aggressive instinct serves the
"equally fundamental need" of man "to assert himself." "a The two

forces are in constant competition, though the social instinct generally
prevails. In law, society provides an instrument to better insure that
such will be the outcome. "The prime operative duty of law is the
control of human aggressiveness." 148 It is, in its psychological function, a reinforcing agency to thwart and discourage "the potential criminal in every man." 149
Law is simultaneously a suppressive agency, encouraging and
supporting stability in man's relationship with his social environment.
It is the latter emphasis that represents the view of law taken by a more
144. See notes 19, 22 supra and accompanying text.
145. WEST, CONSCrENCE AND SocI=r (1945).
146. See id. at 152.
147. Ibid.
148. Id. at 165.
149. Ibid.
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orthodox Freudian than Dr. West-Dr. Franz Alexander. Dr. Alexander, writing in collaboration with Judge Hugo Staub, 5 ' suggests that
a prime psychological function of law is to maintain and support the
individual's sense of justice, "an inner psychic regulator, which automatically guarantees certain self-imposed restrictions in the interest of
the community." I-" The sense of justice is a psychic equilibrator. By
it, the individual renounces socially destructive drives with the implicit understanding or expectation that others will do likewise. The
failure of adherence on the part of any individual is to be attended by
society, and therein enters law. Any failure or inequity of the law in
the redress of the balance in each individual's relationship to society
results in a disturbance of every individual's sense of justice, and in
disappointment and irritation with the law. It is, then, the importance
of law to see that "the common sense of justice remains uninjured." 152
"When the public shows undisturbed confidence in the legal institutions and their official representatives, then we may say that the common sense of justice is in harmony with the demands of the powers
that be."' 53 Failing this acquittal of law's function, then "the continuation of law and order becomes possible only through the increase
of the external power of the law." '4
In Alexander's view, law is particularly recognized only as a
supportive and protective agency for antecedent psychological processes, and it is destructive of these processes if it is not functioning
with proper subtlety and effect. It would appear that the psychoanalytically oriented doctors, West and Alexander, are in agreement that
law is a force of some instrumental psychic consequence to all individuals in society, and must be considered for its psychological meaning
to the individual. But, for Dr. Alexander, law appears as an external
influence on psychic processes that seem to take on their essential
character elsewhere or in other terms. For Dr. West, law seems somewhat more of a fixed determinant in the psychological growth and,
particularly, the behavior of the individual.
The preeminent learning theorist, Professor B. F. Skinner, also
views law as a constant. He deals with it as a rule whose substance
consists of some specified behavior attended by some proposed consequence to the individual who engages in such behavior. 55 "A law
150.
1956).

ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE

151. Id. at 13.
152 Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
155. See SKINNER,

SCIENCE AND HUMAN

BEHAVIOR 138-39

PUBLIC (rev. ed.

(1953).
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is a rule of conduct in the sense that it specifies the consequences of
certain actions which in turn 'rule' behavior." 156 Professor Skinner
thus takes the position, consonant with reinforcement theories of learning,"h that law influences individual behavior by producing effects upon
him, usually in the nature of punishment, when he violates rules that
have the formal sanction of a government agency. Behavior may not
be, and probably is not, originally conditioned by the controlling practices and contingencies set forth for behavior by governmental agencies.
The actual conditioning is left to others-parents, friends, other agencies
-most certainly so as to the minor contingencies of behavior that set
the pattern for ethical conduct. To the extent that governmental law
is a controlling agency in behavior it acts as a reinforcer of patterns of
conduct already developed through other instrumentalities."' Phrasing
its effect differently, a law, by creating unpleasant effects, for others as
well as for the individual himself, reduces the probability that any
individual will engage in a particular behavior. The individual receives "aversive stimulation" that influences his behavior response.
Professor Skinner's view of law is familiar, though perhaps cast
in a newer language and a more disciplined descriptive system. To be
entirely fair to Skinner, however, it must be recognized that his
references to law are only allusive and intend no definition or scope as
to its full psychological quality. His concern is to show the potentiality of a learning theory approach to explain a large range of behavior.
Alexander, Skinner, and perhaps to some extent West afford only
brief reflections on law in passing to some other matter that is more
certainly in the orbit of their attention. Usually, this matter is the
causal explanation of psychological behavior, and the consideration
of social problems relating to this behavior. There is no fuller contemplation of the law in terms of psychological process. Partly, it is
because law, in their minds at least, does not enter that much into the
discussion. Partly, too, there is the connected explanation that law is
known or contemplated only colloquially or, at best, very narrowly.
There is a ring of substantial unfamiliarity in discourse about it. Yet,
among the more theoretically inclined, these gentlemen appear to have
ventured further into the matter than any other contemporary psychologists, judged by Anglo-Saxon writings.
There is a clear challenge to be recognized at this point, a
challenge to make more capital of the possible theoretical connections
156. Id. at 339.
157. See authorities cited notes 34, 35 supra.
158. SKINNM, op. cit. supra note 155, at 339.
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between law and psychology. A polished theory is perhaps beyond
present reach, but there may be timely gain from hypotheses, hypotheses
whose credibility in the minds of others now rest only in their apparent
truth as given by surmise and by "feeling."
Following are just such hypotheses about the psychological meanings and influences of law in individual and, to a lesser extent, social
behavior. Their emphasis is upon some reciprocal subconscious processes and effects between the structure and operation of authority in
law and the behavior of the individual. The nodal premise is that
individuals shape and share social experience because of a drive emanating out of and responding to a natural condition in social life.
PSYCHOLOGICAL DEPENDENCY AND THE LAW

Man's struggle for self-determination is a constant reminder that
dependency is his natural state. He is dependent on his culture, on
his fellow men and, with all of that, on the vicissitudes of blind nature.
The master psychologist, Freud,"5 9 viewed dependency as the earliest
state of human life. If it persisted well into life it was a pathological
state. Dependency was a condition identified within the scope of close
family relationships and, in the normal state of affairs, one obviously
outgrew one's dependency upon one's mother.
But, in a larger pantoscope, one does not "outgrow" the support
of culture and human relations. In fact, the longer one endures social
living the more one becomes dependent on its contacts and its instrumentalities. As to man's culture, at least, Freud does acknowledge that
man is "destined to remain a child forever." 160
However, the story behind psychological theories of adaptation is
that man has been anything but entirely submissive to his natural state.
Prodded by his native talent, particularly his genius for imagination and
problem-solving and, with these, taking hold of the frustrations and
challenges presented in his environment, man has dissociated himself
somewhat from raw nature. He is rebellious, ingenious, creative,
resourceful and otherwise equipped with drive and intelligence to
counter and change his natural state. His is the constant struggle of
independence versus dependence, of adjustment and fulfillment, of security and freedom. He is, basically, in a state of perpetual ambivalence
that is more or less stabilized in notable behavior patterns.
159. Freud said comparatively little about man's dependency as a matter of support
in relation to his environment. His occasional references to the subject may be found
in THE FuTuRE OF AN ILLUsION 28-42 (Robson-Scott transl. 1928), and cf. THE
P0RoBLEm OF Awxmry 108-09, 149-51 passim (Bunker transl. 1936).
160. FREuD, THE FuTuRE OF AN ILLUsION 42 (Robson-Scott transl. 1928).
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In the concatenation of drives and forces, law is not exempt.
Law nurtures and ministers to our dependency. We rely on its
authority and its strength to punish the bad, right wrongs, protect us
against evil and give us our fair share of things. With more notable
pith, Jerome Frank states that man "unconsciously has tried to find
in the law a substitute for those attributes of firmness, sureness, certainty and infallibility ascribed in childhood to the father." 101
But, being palpable theorists in our daily lives, we also resent law
to some extent. We resent its monopoly of strength, its uncompromising demands for adaptation and order, its blundering execution of
purpose, its insensate morality. We resent the way in which it frustrates our drives and sometimes our personal judgments even as it
binds us to the rest of humanity in doing so. It is too much the tool
of adjustment and the frustrating agent of what West has termed the
"self-assertive instinct." 162
Our basic attitude toward law, before the refinements induced
by the Freudian devices of conscious and unconscious suppression, and
rationalization, is one of ambivalence. We want it, need it-and dislike
it. Our primitive dispositions are revealed in our attitude toward the
criminal offender. Much has been said of our animus toward this
offender and our desire to see him punished.'3 But not enough has
been said of the vicarious satisfaction we feel and sometimes express
when the criminal offender "beats" the law. It may be, as Alexander
suggests, that we all have "genuine criminal instinctual drives" 16
which we share with the criminal. This choleric interpretation may be
adjusted to indicate that our feelings express appreciation for the independence asserted by the offender, however poor his social judgment
may have been.
Our basically uncertain attitude toward the law, one of many
ambivalences we hold, contributes to great personal discomfort.
Psychic economies demand some better resolutions than continuing
overt conflict, and so we adopt distinctive patterns of behavior in
relation to the law.
161. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 21 (1949).
162. See text at p. 500 mspra.
163. See, e.g., REIWALD, SOCIETY AND ITS CRIMINALS 246-82 (1950) ; ALEXANDER
& STAUB, op. cit. supra note 150, at 215-23; WEIHOFEN, THE URGE To PUNISH 138-41
(1956) ; ZILBOoRG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 75-95
(1954). One is here reminded of Sir James Stephen's famous dictum, "[T]he execution of criminal justice . . . stand[s] to the one set of passions [deliberate anger
and righteous disapprobation] in the same relation in which marriage stands to the
other [sexual passion]." 2 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
82 (1883).
164. ALEXANDER & STAUB, op. cit supra note 150, at 30.

19591

PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWS IN JURISPRUDENCE

In their ultimate adjustments most people accept their dependency
upon the law and recognize it as one of the devices that regulate the
dangers and uncertainties in social reality with which they cannot cope
by themselves. Law is mostly ultimate and beyond reach, and dependency is full and complete. Dr. Kardiner describes this process of
stabilizing dependency feelings in the following terms:
"[Dependency] is a basic ego attitude necessary for survival,
in response to an anxiety resulting from a feeling of helplessness,
or to a feeling of limited resources, strength or ability. The attitude is one of soliciting support, help, or protection. The subject will . . . delegate to the object of dependency great powers,

will attribute to him abilities to do things which the subject cannot
do for himself." 1'5

The basic struggle, independence versus dependency, passes to the
unconscious in this area of experience and, if it persists, will be sustained
on some other social front. Dependency on the law is the prevailing
attitude. Consciousness of conflict about this attitude is likely to
occur mostly when there is an acute exposure to or awareness of the
operation of law.
Occasionally, the personality committed to dependency upon the
law will surreptitiously transgress the law, traffic laws for example,
as if to deny complete dependency and the insuperability of the law. In
fact, the proof is weakly chosen and unconvincing, since the risks in
transgression and punishment are slight. The action is mostly symbolic. The transgressor would assert a tendency to deny complete
dependency, but not to the point of seriously challenging law as a
source of support, and injuring himself in the process.
There are, in fact, rebels dedicated in their opposition to law.
These are the persons, denominated criminal for the most part, who
have not come to terms with their basic conflict. Opposition to law
symbolizes their struggle for independence and theirs is a constant
effort to deny their dependency. Dependency is, however, their basic
condition and, notwithstanding the opposition, their basic expectation.
Their actions belie their professed attitudes, as they provoke the law to
make decisions and arrangements for them. Mostly, they cannot overcome the law and do not expect to. Their criminal acts, the evidence
of protest against their weakness, are the simultaneous admission of
dependency. In the end, they have "no more pressing need than the one
to find somebody to whom [they] can surrender." '
165. KARDINEi, THE INDIVIDUAL AND His SoCIETY 32 (1939).
166. DosToEvsi'y, THE BROTHERS KARA_!AZOV (Garnett transl. 1955).
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Suppression and adaptation confirm a massive dependency upon
the law. Aggression and opposition are not an effective denial.
Dependency is the expected and the confirmed state of adjustment.
It is only exploitation that pivots the balance wheel so as to evidence
man's success, from time to time, in establishing some psychological
autonomy for himself.
Exploitation is the betrayal of man's wishes to conform reality
to some personal image of a superior state of existence. Depending
upon his vanity, he may contemplate this state only for himself or
for as much as all humanity. The boldness of his plan marks the degree
and the kind of balance he would achieve between his strivings for
independence and his natural state of dependency. The extent of his
success identifies the degree of independence he has in fact achieved.
The exploitation of law is generally a well-guarded effort, protected
and often disguised in terms of conformity to some set of social
practices that, in themselves, have a dutiful attitude toward the law.
The exploiter conforms to business or professional practices, or political
proprieties, or scholarly methods, as he seeks to gain particular advantage of and even modify the law. A general dependency on some
strength and authority outside of himself is acknowledged, but it also
serves as a base for asserting some personal independence in regard to
the law.
The successful exploiter establishes a base of his dependency upon
his environment and uses this to achieve some relatively small degree
of independence from it. Acknowledging dependency as a natural
state, he is, relatively speaking, psychologically independent. The unsuccessful exploiter misinterprets the foundations of his independence
and pushes himself out on a limb without support. His strivings for
independence fail to calculate adequately his need for support and for
disguise. His frustration is the more complete as his boldness is his
undoing and he is frequently coerced into a state of complete psychological dependency.
The temper of those who work closely with the law is cast in
the same mold as the rest of humanity on the matter of dependency.
In fact, those close to the law tend to exaggerate, and even to caricature,
the character of human adjustments to the problem.
The largest majority of law-workers characteristically assume and
accept a role of complete dependency in relation to the law. Law,
in the subconscious, represents support and sustenance for strong dependency. The law-worker is the servant of law. He faithfully
supports and upholds it, executes it and asserts its predominance and
authority, and simultaneously receives gratification in doing so. He
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evidences a strong subconscious, and sometimes conscious, resistance to
tampering with it. To safeguard his attitude and acceptance of dependency in relation to the law, the law-worker may create and support
an aura and mystique about it, bordering on the invocation of magic.
The mystique disguises and does away with uncertainties about the law
and resentment against it. To be sure, the law-worker does not fool
himself completely by what he is doing but he would rather have the
ironic touch that law thus gives reality than discard the veil that nurtures and protects his dependency.
In a sense, everybody is dependent upon some larger identification, outside of personal life, to cope with physical and social realities.
Education, the more so particular kinds of education, and social and occupational identifications place a person in a more secure relationship
to larger social realities and enable him to cope with them. Those
whose identifications are with law simply select a more certain and
more definite means for continuing and satisfying dependency, and
coping with social reality.
But among law-workers there are also those who express opposition to the law as an element of their struggle over dependency.
And these in turn are at least superficially close to others who exploit
the la~w in a truer effort to gain independence.
There are among law-workers some who actively seek the shelter
and nurture law provides their psychological being. The acknowledgment of dependency, however, is a troubling denial of personal strength
and autonomy. Under cover of law, they seek to deny their dependency
through a bruising assertion of authority. The larger and the more
entrenched the dependency, the firmer may be their protest. Theirs is
none of the substance of independence; they assert only resistance in
the form of a demonstration of personal power that the law itself gives.
Their adjustment has many of the marks of the "identification with the
aggressor" so acutely described by Anna Freud 167 within a more clearly
Freudian framework of behavior. In their most extreme virulence they
are "psychopaths on the side of the law."
The exploiters among the law-workers essentially accept their
dependence upon the law. Theirs is an effort to make law a nobler
or more responsive device. Their effort is a monument to personal
talent and, of more particular psychological moment, evidence of substantial strength and relative independence. Their contemplation of
balance or adjustment in the qualities and uses of the law is the social
manifestation of a psychological process involving the adjustment of
167. A. FRn-Up,

transl. 1946).

THE EGo AND THE MECHANISMS

oF DE-EcE 117-31

(Baines
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independence versus dependency needs. They draw mixed and sometimes conflicting reactions of awe and approval, and fear, opposition
and resentment, as they tamper with basic views, feelings and adjustments in the essential psychological struggle that is keen to law-workers
and common to all. In the end, they may verge on parasitism, a familiar
accusation against less principled lawyers, ineffectual scholars and incautious judges. Or, if they are the likes of a Justice Holmes 168 and,
more particularly, a Justice Cardozo " in the skill of their efforts and
the sweep of their success, they will be anointed with a nobility and
authority almost as great as that of law itself. They become the
symbols of genius, of strength and justice and, at rock bottom, of
psychological independence.
The psychological archetypes represent the dominant strains in
human adjustment and characterize essential dispositions as regard
some important element in behavior, e.g., dependence versus independence. They exist in their pure-bred state but they are also subject to
hybridism. In fact, for any individual they may be in particular
stages of hybridization or change-over ranging in effects from complete conflict and uncertainty to exaggeration or confusion. The
possibility of characterology is multiplied no end but it is recognition
of the essential elements and dispositions that are important, for these
are the working materials of adjustment and progress. They are
human mortar, so far as the law is concerned. In biological terms,
they provide its tissue culture.
Law and the Sense of Justice
The sense of justice, as Professor Edmond Cahn points out, is
static and merely contemplative.' ° It is really the sense of injustice
that moves us. To Professor Cahn, the sense of injustice acts as a social
balance wheel for the law. It mediates for the law and guides it. In
our psychological framework, the sense of injustice is the small but
penetrating voice that signals psychological distress, akin to the sense
of pain that Jhering describes in The Struggle for Law.Y It signals
threat and frustration to the balance and adjustment achieved in the
basic struggle relating to dependency. It is the outcry when law acts
to smother us too completely and, on the other hand, it is the anguish
when dependency upon the law is brusquely challenged or denied.
168. HoLmEs,

THE CoaDoN LAw

(1881)

is prime evidence of an exploitative mind

in relation to law.
169. Perhaps the finest exploitative effort in connection with law is to be found
in the acutely developed ideas and views Cardozo presents in THE PARADOXES OF
LEGAL SCIENCE (1930) and in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922).
170. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 13 (1949).
171. See id. at 41.
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The excesses of the demands of law bring to a state of consciousness acute feelings of restriction and frustration resulting from
the complete power and dominance of this social agency. Law can
support the human personality, and its support may be accepted and
even solicited. But, if its effect is recognized as stifling, it breeds
anguish, discontent and opposition.
At the other extreme, for law to permit a degree of opposition that
challenges its supremacy, or a degree of independence that denies essential dependency upon it, is equally cause for distress. Borrowing
from the more sanguine interpretive framework of Alexander, injustice
"transforms the chronic yet static state of embitterment into an acute
dynamic state of rebellion." 172 It must retain its nurturant and regulative character with great consistency.
The sense of injustice is an ultimate human resource for regulating
and safeguarding stable psychological adjustments to social reality. It
does so by maintaining a symbolic relationship with the law.
The sense of injustice is keenest in those whose exploitation of the
law reveals a greater (conscious or subconscious) sensitivity to balancing and adjusting basic psychological dispositions. In them it becomes
a driving mechanism to adjust the relationship between the state of
dependency of the human being and the scope and power of the law.
If attestation were to rest in one example, Jerome Frank would be the
obvious case.173
The sense of injustice is the least developed where justice acts
merely as the alter ego of law and total dependency is the heavily
predominating state of life. Injustice is synonymous with a failure to
give authority its due. Extrapolating from the psychologist Piaget's
findings on the earliest developmental stage of the sense of justice (and
injustice) in the child, t justice is felt when there is confirmation of a
state of complete dependency on external authority. Anything less
than a complete acknowledgment and responsiveness to authority is a
provocation of the sense of justice.
172. ALEXANDER & STAuB, op. cit. supra note 150, at 4.
173. Frank makes a firm case for this statement by his two principal writings,
LAw AND THE MoDERN MIND (1930) and CouRTs Ox TRIAL (1949).
174. See PiAGEr, TE MORAL JUDGIMENT OF THE CHILD 314 (1948). Piaget
distinguishes three stages, or phases, in the development of a sense of justice. In
the earliest stage, there is "non-differentiation of notions of just and unjust from those
of duty and disobedience: whatever conforms to the dictates of adult authority is
just." Ibid. In the second stage, there is "progressive development of autonomy and
the priority of equality over authority. . . . [T]he only punishments accepted as
really legitimate are those based upon reciprocity." Id. at 315. The third stage is
"characterized by a feeling of equity, which is nothing but the development of equalitarianism in the direction of relativity. Instead of looking for equality in identity the
child no longer thinks of the equal rights of individuals except in relation to the
particular situation of each." Id. at 316.
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Litigation
From the titillation of self-love, many legal theorists have tended
to view litigation as a mutually beneficial reciprocity arrangement between law and humanity. Litigation is law's window to humanity.
Because of the window humanity is better provided for by the law and
happier about it. It is the dark-sided nature of litigation that is
avoided, deflecting from a view of it as a mixed blessing at best.
Couched in terms of pragmatic psychological meanings, litigation
is evidence of a limitation in human development or of regression.
The litigant gives evidence of lacking the necessary personal strength
and resources to cope with reality, even after the structure of law,
particularly its rules, has imparted some means of support. As Goitein
suggests, the litigant suffers feelings of "depreciation and deprivation." 175 His is a state of weakness and regression. Dependence upon
the law becomes acute and inevitable.
The litigant enters into a therapeutic relationship with the law.
But he seeks only a closer identification with it, a firmer dependency
so that he can borrow its strength. The law's response is to encourage
the dependency of litigants. It offers more concerted support to some
and restricts the strivings toward fuller independence of others. The
therapy law offers in litigation is generally supportive or repressive.
It produces a mostly unconscious encouragement for a state of fuller
dependence and intensifies the natural, conservative disposition of the
largest segment of human beings. For those who continue an active
struggle for growth beyond the state of dependence, the operation of
law in litigation tends to intensify their conflict. It is only in heroic
instances that exploiters of the law succeed in turning litigation to the
advantage of an independent turn of mind. Their tactic is to camouflage their operations so that they might be interpreted as in support of
and reliance upon the existing law, giving no evidence that the demands
of law for dependency are not being met.
Generally, it is the prosecuting litigant who seeks to invoke the
greater power of the law and dependence upon it. Yet, curiously, the
litigant is in the anomalous position of electing not to do so should he
so choose. He holds the means of protecting and favoring any tendency
toward a stronger personal independence. In the case of private prosecutors this is mostly a figurative choice, since they are generally reduced
to a state of weakness where marked dependency is almost necessary.
The public prosecutor, however, and, to a lesser extent, the trial
decision-makers, protected in their identification with law, have a dis175. GorrmX,
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cretion to decide the extent to which dependency will be enforced or
independence will be encouraged. Mostly, they accentuate the disposition of the mass of humanity in their own beings. They close the gap
on freer action and assert more repressive claims, less in deliberate
contemplation of theoretical considerations and by reason "of the evaluation of consequences than in subconscious response to acute psychological dispositions seeking greater comfort and safety.
Litigation is concerned more with the most careful preservation of
of law and the encouragement of dependency than with the
power
the
prospects for litigating parties. The energy devoted to the techniques
of operation demonstrates its self-concern. It is encouraged in this
attitude by the nature of its immediate clients. Regressed and weak,
they expect and tolerate the more primitive force of law evidenced in
litigation. Bare knuckles and sheer force, with poorly disguised
amenities, under the shadow of great power and protection, are the
mark of an overwhelming authority displaying its strength to emphasize the weakness and dependency of those about it. It is a brutal form
of reassurance as to the position of the parties, law and litigant, from
which both the law and the particular litigant derive a measure of
conscious or subconscious satisfaction.
Administrative Process
The steady drift toward administrative processes is evidence of a
substantial desire to tone down and even to dilute the devastating
power and the oppressive effects of judicial law in operation. Administrative processes veil the power and the demand of naked authority by
giving it the appearance of being more diffuse and less concentrated.
Their intended disposition is to encourage greater self-regulation in
respondents and the arbitration of differences rather than the imposition
of solutions. They are, in theory, a sensitive response to the growth
potentials and independence strivings that exist in states ranging from
dormancy to volatility in the mass of humanity. Administrative processes evidence the benevolent paternalism of law encouraging the growth
and greater independence of humanity, offering not only support but
also greater self-direction for the largest number.
The subconscious purpose of administrative process is something
less than satisfied. For the larger number of persons who seek only
total dependency upon the law, the freedom administrative process
offers is in the nature of burden and frustration. They seek "escape
76
from freedom" in the pattern suggested by Horney," compensating for
176. See text at p. 475 supra and HovNFY, Tna NEuRoTIc PERSONALITY OF OUR
TrmE (1937).
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inadequacies and frustration by seeking out mantles of power, prestige
and possession. They do not grasp and respond to the potentials and
values of administrative procedure. Since the power of law is veiled
and even diluted in the character of administrative process, those who
only oppose tle law in repetitive compulsion find it easier and safer to
do so where it is administrative law that is concerned. And, finally, the
deconcentration of law in administrative processes seems to encourage
mostly parasitic exploitation. The exploiter who seeks personal advantage is more easily satisfied than the exploiter who eyes the general
welfare.
The psychological theory of administrative processes is in the
midst of a crossfire when put to a practical test. Erosion occurs because
the administrator-representatives of the law are able to exercise their
own native dispositions with blighting effect. In the main, they are
dependent personalities who stay close to the law for the support that
identification with it begets. The intended fluidity of administrative
processes dissolves in their hands because they are accustomed to expect
and receive the benefit of the rigid and rigorous framework of the law.
Their response to the design of administrative procedures is, on the one
hand, to create and assert, in the name of the law, a rigid pattern of
operations and expectations, and inflexible standards of decision. Subconsciously, they steel the pliant framework of administrative process
so that it cannot be discerned as different from the traditional, primitive
courtroom framework of operation.
On the other hand, when the agent of the administrative law does
make the effort to respond to the enlightened purpose of administrative
process, his entrenched dependency renders him without any developed
psychological talent or experience for the task. His lack of such skill
and discipline increases the attraction and need of sheer power. He is
himself inclined to be demanding and impatient, uncritical, insensitive
and arbitrary. He is little Napoleon with epaulets and no pants.
Administrative process is an experiment with "human nature."
In the sheer scope and the nobility of its effort, it has reason to expect
more patience and tolerance, and more careful study, than it has received in some quarters.
Legislation
Legislation is memorialized in time as a process wherein man
can dramatize the potency of his strivings for independence. It is a
glamorous instrument to be manipulated by man to the end of success
against and in relation to his social environment. However, the
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psychological reality is that legislation is split in its personality. It is
simultaneously an instrument of law, for law, and against law.
Man's use of legislation evinces his basic dispositions and conflicts.
As an enterprise, it is attractive to some of man's segment that is keen
on self-assertion and on some degree of domination over a total state
of dependency. On the other hand, it appeals to others primarily as a
vehicle for insulating existing order, or a higher degree of dependency
on the status and character of the social environment. It is this basic
conflict between and within men that compromises the total effect of
legislation in any one direction, short of a cataclysm that nudges it off
the fence and onto one side. Legislation is, on this account, chaotic and
conflict-dominated. Its great moments are reserved more to eloquence
than to accomplishment, though there is sometimes a causal connection
between the two. Typically, legislation may begin on a moment of high
anticipation, with the exploitative man feeling great powers and
urgencies to contravene the general state of dependency in some particular. The espousal creates anguish to the subconscious determination
of others to maintain a sedate state of support on existing reality. Only
near miraculous persuasion and loaded threats of coercion can, from
time to time, preserve the identity of legislation as the original mark
of man on and over his environment. More characteristically, the
legislative process follows a course of expediency and may thunder to a
climax by exercising its authority over the institutions dependent upon
it, through generally conservative control of its means of support and
by coercively reinforcing an attitude of dependency upon this great
power-bearing element of law.
Legislation acutely mirrors man's conflicts more than, at least
more often than, it does his particular strivings in either direction of
independence or dependency. Because it is so impeded, the stronger
instances of direction in man's connection with law are to be found
either in litigation or administrative processes. Legislation is man's
publicized self-view, but litigation and administrative process may be
more likely to determine man's standing in life. In truth, of course, it
must be recognized that there is a multiple relationship of psychological
give and take between the processes of law, and there is some diffusion
in role and appearance. However, each would appear to preserve some
cardinal characteristics and a discrete psychological identity.

